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In the above mentioned article we assessed the worldwide
risk of exposure to radioactivity due to the atmospheric dis-
persion of gases and particles following severe nuclear ac-
cidents, using particulate 137Cs and gaseous 131I as proxies
for the fallout. To evaluate the global risks, we applied em-
pirical evidence to estimate the probability of severe acci-
dents. Our results and the methods used have been subject
of scientiﬁc and public debate. For this reason, we re-opened
the discussion and offered the possibility to contribute com-
ments. We used Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics Discus-
sions as a transparent, public and archived forum, through
the submission of a standard “peer-reviewed commentary”,
which is directly linked to the original scientiﬁc publication.
Commentaries, clariﬁcations and corrections of this nature
are a standard procedure in other journals, although most do
not require peer review of such commentaries as in ACP; we
note that this is not, as asserted in some of the comments, a
submission intended as a new scientiﬁc publication. We have
also used the opportunity of this forum to provide some ad-
ditional information and explanation about the assumptions
and methods basic to our work.
Answers to frequently asked questions about this article:
Q1. Why did you adopt the Chernobyl accident as a
source of radioactivity in your model?
The Chernobyl accident was at the time of our manuscript’s
publication (and is still) the only INES 7 accident for which
a broad consensus exists about the emissions. The emissions
by Chernobyl have been adopted in many previous publi-
cations and were presented as “revised estimates” by IAEA
(2006). Furthermore, Davoine and Bocqet (2007) re-assessed
the Chernobyl source term by inverse modeling and found
that their results are in good agreement with the latest re-
ported emission estimates with only a minor difference in
their temporal representation. Nevertheless, it may be as-
sumed that substantial uncertainties remain. We only used
131I and 137Cs sources from Chernobyl, as these isotopes
are typically emitted from any type of nuclear reactor after
a major accident. For the other reactors accounted for in our
global model the emissions were scaled by their gross capac-
ity to account for the different amounts of nuclear fuel.
Q2. Why didn’t you adopt Fukushima as a source of
radioactivity in your model?
The emissions from Fukushima are associated with a signif-
icant degree of uncertainty, and are subject of scientiﬁc de-
bate. Nevertheless, the order of magnitude of the Fukushima
emissions is meanwhile reasonably well known, at least for
certain species, indicating that they are generally lower than
from Chernobyl. Table 1 in our article presents a range of
emissions based on the two references available at the time of
publication, Chino et al. (2011) and Stohl et al. (2012). If the
Fukushimaemissionsperreactorwouldbeafactoroftenless
than of Chernobyl, and if they would also be more represen-
tative for major accidents than Chernobyl, the calculated risk
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of contamination would decrease proportionally by a factor
of ten. On the other hand, there are several countering factors
which make our estimates of the contamination risk likely
to be underestimates, including the increased modern threat
due to terrorism, and the ageing ﬂeet of operational nuclear
power plants, as well as the contamination due to other ra-
dionuclides (see Q4).
Q3. Why were only Chernobyl and Fukushima consid-
ered in the estimate of the number of major accidents,
and not less severe accidents such as Three Mile Island?
We concentrate on INES 7 events associated with the ma-
jor release of radioactive material, which are by deﬁnition
“major accidents” (INES is the International Nuclear Event
Scale). Although the other accidents also released radioactiv-
ity, the amounts were much smaller (see Table 1 in our arti-
cle). By leaving them out, we arrive at a more conservative
estimate.
Q4. How is “contaminated” by radioactivity deﬁned?
We adopt the deposition of ≥40kBqm−2 as contaminated,
following the deﬁnition given by the IAEA (2005). Note that
this refers to deposition on the ground, not radiation doses
(expressed in Sv). We applied the ≥40 kBqm−2 only to the
deposition of 137Cs, following the literature. However, IAEA
(2005) deﬁnes contamination based on this threshold for all
gamma and beta radiating substances. Thus this is a discrep-
ancy in the literature that needs to be resolved. If we would
apply this deﬁnition of IAEA (2005) strictly, we would have
to add the deposition of substances such as 131I and 134Cs,
which would increase the calculated risk of contamination
accordingly.
Q5. Did you assume that emissions take place only at the
surface?
In the model we emit the radioactive substances by intro-
ducing them into the surface layer of about 60m depth. We
assume that 131I and 137Cs are released gradually and not
explosively or by large ﬁres, which would increase the emis-
sion height. This assumption leads to a conservative estimate
of long-distance transport, which we tested in previous work
(Kunkel et al., 2012). In general, the sensitivity to this as-
sumption for the daytime convective boundary layer is small,
but for the stable nighttime boundary layer the differences
can become more notable.
Q6. Did you use information from non-peer reviewed
publications in your model calculations?
We have used the list of reactors worldwide from Wikipedia,
as referenced in our article. Wehave notyet been made aware
ofspeciﬁcerrorsinthislisting.Fromthislistweonlyusetwo
basic parameters, the geographical location and the gross ca-
pacity of the reactors, documented in the Supplement. The
source strength of radioactivity applied in our model calcu-
lations is based on peer-reviewed publications (about Cher-
nobyl), including reports by the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Q7. Have risk assessments of major nuclear accidents
been performed previously?
Yes, in different forms:
a. In 1990 the Nuclear Regulatory Committee (NRC,
1990) reported on the risk of severe nuclear accidents
in the USA, associated with reactor core melts (we as-
sume that “severe accident” is equivalent to INES 7)1.
NRC (1990) mentioned the following: “Of the plants
analyzed thus far, most have an estimated likelihood
of core melt of between 1 in 10000 and 1 in 100000
per plant year” (NRC, 1990). In the appendix of NRC
(1990), which presents the overall risk estimate, only
the number of 1 in 10000 is included, being a factor of
twolargerthanthepreviousestimatebytheNRC(1975)
of 1 in 20000, and a factor of two smaller than our cur-
rent estimate (1 in 5000). The conclusions of the NRC
have had important inﬂuence worldwide on decisions
to approve nuclear reactor technology. In Germany the
National Risk Study on Nuclear Power Plants Phase A
(GRS, 1980) and Phase B (GRS, 1990) adopted the ba-
sic methodology of the NRC and presented similar con-
clusions about the expected incidence of core melts.
b. For individual reactors a probability risk assessment
(PRA) is performed, which is a standard procedure in
nuclear engineering; however; the results of PRA’s are
not available to us (i.e., not publicly available). There
are published studies available that present methodolo-
gies to perform probabilistic risk assessments of con-
tamination by selected individual nuclear reactor ac-
cidents (e.g., Baklanov and Mahura, 2004). However,
1The INES scale was deﬁned after the Chernobyl accident to
inform the public through a standard that can be applied worldwide,
agreed upon by the IAEA Parties. The term “severe accident” was
deﬁned by the power plant operators/constructors after the Three
Mile Island accident on a scale starting from a transient without
shutdown of the reactor, an accident with a long shutdown, to a
severe accident with core melt (in-vessel or ex-vessel) and closure
of the reactor.
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none addresses the combined risk of multiple reactors
worldwide.
Q8. How do your probability calculations compare with
previous work?
Ideally, we should account for PRA’s of individual nuclear
reactors worldwide. Since these are not available, we sim-
plify the risk assessment by performing a relative compar-
ison of reactors by adopting a single risk proﬁle, based on
empirical information.
a. The appendix of NRC (1990) presents the probability
of a core melt of 1 in 10000 per year, and the probabil-
ity of containment failure 1 in 100. Based on the four
INES 7 events that have actually occurred until 2011,
we deduce a frequency of approximately 1 in 5000 per
year, which we adopt as the statistically expected value.
There are more sophisticated techniques that can be ap-
plied to address this, such as that applied by the NRC
(1990), which arrived at an estimate of 1 in 10000. This
is only a factor of two different from our estimate of 1
in 5000. If we were to redo our calculations instead us-
ing the value directly from the NRC report, our results
would decrease by a uniform factor of two everywhere
in the deposition intensity and the risk of contamination.
In the other direction, a study by G¨ unther et al. (2011)
estimates the probability of a core meltdown caused by
a terrorist act to be 1 in 1000 per year (in Germany).
If we were to apply this estimate uniformly (thus not
even accounting for other risks) the calculated risk of
contamination would increase by a factor of ﬁve.
b. The NRC (1990) also made further assumptions, such
as the probability of full containment after a meltdown
being 99%, which has not been borne out historically.
In fact, the probability estimate of a major release of
radioactivity by NRC (1990), being a combination of 1
in 10000 and the 1 in 100 probability of containment,
is 1 in 1000000. This is 200 times lower than our es-
timate of 1 in 5000. NRC (1990) furthermore assumed
a 90% probability for winds being in a “favorable di-
rection” for evacuation, and a 90% probability of not
having an inversion layer, neither of which is applica-
ble to our analysis of the overall deposition and the risk
of contamination, since we integrate the results globally
in all directions and with an appropriate model-based
weighting for all meteorological conditions that occur
over a year. Finally, NRC (1990) assumed a 10% prob-
ability of evacuation failure, which is not relevant for
computing the risk of ground contamination.
Q9. Are the factors leading to nuclear reactor accidents
independent?
As mentioned in our article, these factors are not necessar-
ily independent. For our calculations we consider the acci-
dentsinFukushimaasindependentbecausethereactorsafety
provisions must be independent. A common cause such as a
tsunami or a terrorist act could as well affect reactors farther
apart from each other, even in different countries. One must
also be aware that three of the 5 active reactor blocks (6 in
total) in Fukushima suffered a meltdown, so it would also
be incorrect to treat them all as a single unit. We could have
also computed the statistics using plants as the unit, rather
than reactor blocks, counting Fukushima as a fractional plant
meltdown. It is worth noting that NRC (1990) also assumed
that reactors are independent; i.e., following the method by
NRC (1990) leads to an underestimate of the risk of nuclear
power plants with multiple reactors.
Q10. Why are the model calculations performed over an
entire year, considering that major accidents typically
release radioactivity over a much shorter period?
By integrating the model calculated deposition over a year
we capture the total contamination by137Cs over the range
of meteorological conditions that might be encountered by
an accidental release, which could occur at any time during
the year. In reality the emission and deposition occur over
a much shorter period. Based on sensitivity simulations we
show that the accumulated risk of contamination over longer
time periods (e.g., a year) is nearly the same for continuous
emissions as the average of the deposition that occurs when
emissions take place only over one week, and are then av-
eraged for individual simulations representing all 52 weeks
of the year. Thus, we can reduce our model simulation time
by a factor of 52, which allows us to reasonably consider the
entire set of currently active nuclear reactors worldwide.
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